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THE DEATH OF A PROFESSION?
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association'
Lawyers occupy a particular position in society as members of a "learned
profession".2 Whiie the concept of a "learned profession" has often been
criticized as being rooted in self-serving romanticism,3 it is more accurately
based upon the special ethical standards governing lawyers. It serves as a
means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unmatched power they
wield in the American judicial system.4 The training and specialization
process of the legal profession allows its members to operate within the
efficient and equitable constraints of the American legal system.-
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association6 addresses attorney advertising;
a practice not easily reconciled with the great ethical demands which the
legal profession requires of attorneys in their conduct towards both in-
dividual clients and society as a whole.7
In Shapero, the Supreme Court announced that attorney advertising,
in the form of direct-mail solicitation to potential clients known to face
particular legal problems, cannot be categorically prohibited by a state, so
long as the solicitation is truthful and non-deceptive."
The legal profession's secondary identity as an economic entity has
been treated like the ugly step sister throughout the years. Nonetheless the
legal practice is a creature of economic self-interest and is subject to the
1. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
2. Id. at 1930. See generally R. POUND, Tm LAWYER FRoM ANTIQUITY TO
MODERN TmnEs (1953).
3. 108 S. Ct. at 1930.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 726 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987), rev'd,
108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
7. See, e.g., People ex rel. Maupin v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 188, 32
P. 280, 280 (1893) (suggesting that "[t]he ethics of the legal profession forbid that
an attorney should advertise his talents or his skill, as a shopkeeper advertises his
wares").
8. 108 S. Ct. at 1917.
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basic mechanical effects of supply and demand.9 Its growing sophistication
has made these effects an even more pressing reality.'0
While the legal community is uneasy with the introduction of advertising
into the legal marketplace," economists recognize that advertising and self-
promotion have a great effect on the mechanics of supply and demand. 12
Generally speaking, advertising plays a beneficial role in lowering prices
and stimulating competition in a particular market. 3 Conversely, restriction
in truthful advertising, which artificially interferes with transmission of
price information to consumers, reduces the efficiency of the free market.
Courts and the legal community are striving to balance concepts of
the "learned profession" and the harsh realities of an increasingly complex
and competitive legal market. This Note will discuss the legal analysis
surrounding attorney advertising and the practical ramifications of Shapero.
In 1985, Richard D, Shapero, a Louisville attorney and member of
the Kentucky Bar Association, 14 applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Ad-
vertising Commission 5 for approval of a letter 16 he desired to mail to
9. See 108 S. Ct. at 1930.
10. Id.
11. Antiquated ethical considerations bearing on attorney advertising have
evidently retained vitality, at least among the legal community. A 1978 survey
indicated that a vast majority of attorneys oppose lawyer advertising (89°/0). Victor,
A Commentary on Legal Advertising, 66 WOMENS L.J. 6, 6 (1980) (citing Murphy,
A.B.A's Ad Guidelines Expanded to Allow T. V., Editor & Publisher, at 16 (Aug.
19, 1978)).
12. See, e.g., Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213
(1961).
13. See, e.g., J. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND CoMPETrTIoN: THE
CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); A. MAuRI & T. KELLY, PRICES AND CONSUMIER
INFORmATION: TrE BFNmTs FROM PosTrNa RETAIL GAsoUNE PRICES (1978); Benham
& Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective of Information
Control, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 421 (1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the
Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. & EcoN. 337 (1972); Cady, An Estimate of the Price
Effects of Restrictions on Drug Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493 (1976).
14. 726 S.W.2d at 300.
15. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3)(a) provided in full:
There shall be created an Attorney Advertising Commission (hereafter
Commission) which shall perform such functions in regulating attorney
advertising as prescribed in this rule. The purposes of the Commission
are to aid lawyers to ethically advertise and protect the public.
16. The proposed letter read as follows:
"It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If
this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow
you keep your home by ORDERING you [sic] creditor to STOP and give
you more time to pay them.
"You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE
information on how you can keep you [sic] home.
"CALL NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to
do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it
is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
108 S. Ct. at 1919.
[Vol. 54
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potential clients who had a foreclosure suit filed against them.'7 The
Advertising Commission ruled that Shapero's proposed letter violated Ken-
tucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) in that "it is a letter precipitated
by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or
addressees as distinct from the general public."'" On November 26, 1986,
Shapero petitioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for a review of the advisory
opinion regarding the propriety under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.135(5)(b)(i) of proposed direct targeted mail to a person with specified
legal problems.' 9
The Kentucky court, after finding the Kentucky rule unconstitutional, 20
turned to the American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct
7.321 as an effective form by which the state may exercise its authority to
regulate legal advertising. 22 Using Model Rule 7.3, the Kentucky Supreme
Court did not believe that Shapero's form letter protected the public from
"overreaching, intimidation or misleading private targeted mail solicita-
tion." 23 The court viewed the letter's specific nature as a form of direct
solicitation and therefore potentially ripe for abuse.24 The Kentucky court
affirmed the decision of the ethics and advertising committees and denied
Shapero's request to utilize the form letter. Yet the court did not enunciate
clearly how Rule 7.3 cured the infirmities of the state rule.25
17. Id.
18. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided in full:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee
only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family,
to whom it is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only
if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence
involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the
general public.
The Commission specifically proclaimed the principles in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) and recommended the Kentucky Supreme
Court amend its rules. Shapero petitioned the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky
Bar for an advisory opinion as .to the Rule's validity. See Ky. SuP. CT. RULE
3.530 n.1. The Ethics Committee, in a formal opinion adopted by the Board of
Governors, did not find the letter misleading or fraudulent, but upheld Rule
3.135(5)(b)(i) "on the grounds that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the American
Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of Professional Conduct (1984)." 108 S. Ct.
at 1920.
19. See 726 S.W.2d at 300.
20. Id. at 299. The court held, citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)
and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), that a state can prohibit
non-misleading attorney advertising only when it asserts a substantial interest in
so doing and the abridgement of the commercial speech is proportionate to that




24. Id. at 301.
25. 108 S. Ct. at 1917.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and on June 13,
1988, reversed and remanded the findings of the Kentucky Supreme Court.26
Justice Brennan penned the majority opinion which held that a state could
not, consistent with the first and fourteenth amendments, categorically
prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending
truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face par-
ticular legal problems. 27
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The history of ethical and judicial restraints on attorney advertising is
deeply rooted in American history. Over a century ago, the Alabama bar
became the first state bar association to adopt a code of ethical standards
for attorney behavior.? The Alabama code provided the ethical precepts
of present day state bar associations. Conceptually, the code provided a
framework designed to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and to
protect consumers from questionable professional practices. 29 It permitted
attorneys to provide useful information about legal services but did not
allow attorneys to solicit particular clients.A0
In 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) first published its "Canon
of Professional Ethics"." The ABA adopted thirty-two canons that were
very similar to the Alabama Code, and in 1922 began to issue formal
opinions interpreting the canons. The first of these formal opinions dealt
with attorney advertising and stated in part; "any conduct that tends to
commercialize or bring 'bargain counter' methods into the practice of law
lowers the profession in public confidence and lessens its ability to render
efficiently that high character of service to which the members of the legal
community are called." '32
Prior to 1975, bar associations were free to regulate conduct and uphold
the philosophical mandates mentioned in the formal opinions. However,
in 1975, the United States Supreme Court for the first time rejected bar
26. Id. at 1916.
27. Id.
28. AL AAm STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETmcs, 118 Ala. xxiii (1899,
first adopted by Alabama State Bar Association in 1887) (1887) (cited in C. WOLFRAi,
MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 53-54 nn.20 & 21 (1986)).
29. ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETmcs, 118 Ala. xxiii (1887).
30. Canon 16 of the Alabama Code allowed attorney advertising in news-
papers, but called for restraint in the form and manner of presentation. AI.ABmA
STATE BA ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETIcs, 118 Ala. xxvii (1887).
31. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETMCS Canon 27 (1908) (quoted in Amer-
ican Bar Foundation, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics 74-75
(1967)).
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restraints on the commercial practices of the legal professional. In Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar,33 the Court held that the Virginia State Bar Association
could be sued for violations of the Sherman Act's proscription against
price fixing.34 This was the first time the Supreme Court subjected the
organized bar to the strictures of the federal antitrust laws.
The legal profession also has predicated regulation of advertising upon
the assumption that such regulation did not constitute a violation of the
first amendment. 35 Courts reasoned that advertising was economically rather
than politically motivated, thereby outside the scope of first amendment
protection. Valentine v. Christensen6 gave authority to the notion that
"commercial speech'"' does not deserve first amendment protection. The
Court in Valentine upheld a ban on street distribution of advertising
notices.38 In so deciding, the Court pronounced that "the Constitution
imposes no ... restraint on government as respects to purely commercial
advertising. '
3 9
The Supreme Court formulated the modern commercial speech doctrine
in 1976 with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council.40 At issue was a Virginia statute banning drug price
33. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
34. Id. at 791-92; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1974).
35. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd.
of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
36. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
37. The Suprene Court has characterized commercial speech as that which
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). For an in-
depth discussion of the development of commercial speech, see Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 V.AND.
L. Riv. 1 (1979).
38. Id. at 54.
39. Id. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In Bigelow, the Court
reversed a conviction of a newspaper publisher from printing, in violation of a
Virginia statute, an advertisement publicizing the availability of legal abortions in
New York. Id. at 825-26. The Bigelow court announced a modification of the
commercial speech doctrine by distinguishing "purely commercial speech" from
constitutionally protected communications that conveyed information or rendered
an opinion and explained that the Valentine decision related only to "a reasonable
regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed."
Id. at 819.
40. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, a consumer group
challenged a Virginia statute prohibiting the advertising of prescription drug prices.
Id. at 749-52. In fact, the Court stated that "the notion of unprotected 'commercial
speech' all but passed from the scene" with the Bigelow decision. Id. at 759. Still
most commentators credit to Virginia Board of Pharmacy the unambiguous rejection
of the concept of commercial speech as not having first amendment protection.
See, e.g., Fuchsberg, Commercial Speech: Where It's At, 46 BROOKLYN L. Rnv.
1989]
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advertisements. 4' The Court identified three major first amendment justi-
fications for permitting prescription drug price advertising. First, it noted
that even a speaker delivering a "purely economic" message is deserving
of some degree of first amendment protection.42 Secondly, the Court stated
that consumers have a keen interest in receiving commercial information
with which to make informed economic decisions. 43 Finally, and somewhat
more generally, the Court found that the freedom to advertise played an
essential part in the free enterprise system in that it promotes competition.
4
Such was the state of the doctrine of commercial speech, when in 1979
in Bates v. State Bar Association,45 the Court faced a direct challenge to
a state's restrictions on attorney advertising. 46 In Bates, two lawyers had
been disciplined for placing a newspaper advertisement, which included a
fee schedule for routine matters, for their legal clinic. 47
The Court held that the "[s]tate may [not] prevent the publication in
a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement covering the availability
and terms of routine legal services." 48 The Court deliberated over the state
interest supporting continued prohibition of attorney advertising and con-
cluded: "[W]e are not persuaded that any of the proferred justifications
rise to the level of an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising
by attorneys." '49
Interestingly, the Bates Court relied heavily upon the reasoning of
Virginia Board of Pharmacy." In particular, the Court emphasized that
389, 395-97 (1980).
Since Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court's treatment of commercial speech
has become perhaps more sophisticated, and more methodical. See Central Hudson
Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) in which Justice Powell articulated
a "four-part analysis" to be employed in commercial speech cases:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within the provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
41. 425 U.S. at 748.
42. Id. at 762.
43. Id. at 757, 763-64.
44. Id. at 764-65.
45. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
46. Id. The advertised services included uncontested divorces, uncontested
adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and name changes. Id. at 354.
47. Id. at 355-56.
48. Id. at 384.
49. Id. at 379.
50. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976). As a matter of fact, the Bates Court explained: "We have set
[Vol. 54
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the benefits that would inure to consumers from the free flow of commercial
information outweighed the interests of the government in regulating at-
torney conduct. Society in general has an overwhelming interest in the free
flow of truthful commercial information.51
A year after Bates, the Court examined the propriety of a classic case
of "ambulance chasing" or "in-person solicitation" in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association . 2 In this case, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court imposing disciplinary
sanctions on an attorney for in-person solicitation of clients.53 In reaching
its decision, the Court reaffirmed the state's role in maintaining standards
among members of licensed professions.
The controversy of attorney conduct then shifted in In Re R.M.J., to
a discussion of attorney direct-mail communications . 4 Following the Bates
decision, the Missouri Supreme Court attempted to forge a balance between
the prohibition of attorney advertising, and unlimited permissibility.55 Ri-
chard M. Jacobs, a Clayton, Missouri lawyer, issued a number of letters
announcing the opening of his new office.56 The letters contained a list of
areas in which Jacobs practiced. The designations of the practice areas on
that list deviated from those prescribed by the Missouri rule.5 7 One of the
letters was inadvertently mailed to a married couple with which he had
no personal or professional ties.58 In subsequent disbarment proceedings,
the Missouri Supreme Court reprimanded Jacobs for violating the state's
advertising rule. 9 But the Missouri court declined to disbar him, because
it was aware that this was "a 'test' case, and that respondent's violation
S. . [was] minimal." 6 The Missouri court articulated that it had exercised
good faith in annunciating the disciplinary rules pursuant to Bates.6' The
out this detailed summary of the Pharmacy opinion because the conclusion that
Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment might be said to
flow a fortiori from it." 433 U.S. at 365.
51. 433 U.S. at 368-77.
52. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Ohralik involved an attorney who obtained con-
tingent fee arrangements from two young women who had been injured in an
automobile accident; he solicited the case in person - one of the women was actually
approached while hospitalized and in traction. Id. at 448-52.
53. Id. at 455-57.
54. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
55. See Mo. R. Ct. DR-2-101(A)(2) (1978). The rule provided that an attorney
may send a "brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associates
or addresses, change of firm name or similar matters ... sent only to lawyers,
clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives." See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 609
S.W.2d 411, 412 (1980).
56. 455 U.S. at 196.
57. Id. at 197.
58. Id. at 198, 206 n.20.
59. See In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980).
60. Id. at 412.
61. See id. at 411-12.
19891
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court, however, did not express a view as to the continued validity of the
a .vertising rules under the prevailing commercial speech analysis.62
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Missouri
judgment. Justice Powell, 63 writing for the majority, held that a state may
not regulate a lawyer's commercial speech unless the speech is inherently
or demonstrably misleading, or the regulation is narrowly drawn to prevent
specific and significant abuse.64 Applying these principles, Justice Powell
found that the state's prohibition on the use of certain terms to describe
areas of legal practice such as "real estate" but not "property," did not
serve a substantial governmental purpose. 65
The Court also focused on the allegation that the attorney had im-
permissibly mailed cards to persons other than former clients. The Court
found nothing in the record that would support a substantial governmental
purpose to prevent such mailings, or a finding that they were inherently
misleading.66 In short, the Court forced the state to lift the absolute ban
on direct mail solicitation unless it could prove that the ban was absolutely
necessary. 67 Most recently, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,6
the Supreme Court restated that an attorney's advertising was commercial
speech and entitled to the constitutional protection of the first amendment.
In Shapero,69 the Court discussed the categorical prohibition of solic-
itation of legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and non-
deceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems.20
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, laid the fundamental suppositions
that attorney advertising is "in the category of constitutionally protected
commercial speech." '71
The concepts of Zauderer and Central Hudson Gas framed the level
of state regulation of commercial speech that is constitutionally permissible,
such that regulation may extend only as far as the state's interest in
preventing potential deception and confusion.72 Brennan pointed out that
62. See id. "If he... obtains a favorable [decision on appeal to the Supreme
Court], we can then decide whether we will honor our duty to exercise 'superintending
control over all courts' in Missouri (Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4) or will order DR-
2-101 excised from Rule 4 of this Court." Id.
63. Justice Powell's influence in this area of constitutional law has proven
to be considerable, having written the majority opinions in Ohralik, 432 U.S. 447
(1978) and Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).




68. 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
69. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
70. Id.
71. See generally id. at 1919-24.
72. Id. at 1921; see 726 S.W.2d at 301.
[Vol. 54
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the categorical ban of attorney advertisement has been limited to "in-
person solicitations by lawyers for profit. '""7
The Court undertook a thorough analysis of the area of written direct
solicitations. The Court pointed out that there must first be a contextual
analysis of the advertisement. 74 Shapero's letter contained no false or
misleading information. 75 Rather, the Kentucky court objected to the fact
that the proposed letter targeted persons "known to need [the] legal services"
offered in his letter. 6 The Shapero Court dismissed the distinction between
general mail solicitation versus direct mail solicitation. 7
Justice Brennan concluded that a prudent advertiser would not want
his resources to be scattered freely, but rather his goal would be efficient
distribution of his materials to a broad, yet targeted audience.7 8 As a result,
Brennan stated, "the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain
speech merely because it is more efficient . . . on the theory that to mail
it only to those whom it would most interest is somehow inherently ob-
jectionable. '' 7
The Court also addressed the fictitious assumption that a potential
client with legal problems will always be overwhelmed and emotionally
vulnerable to direct-mail solicitation. 0 Justice Brennan illustrated that this
overly paternalistic attitude is unwarranted. It is natural for a client to
feel overwhelmed by his legal troubles, and his ability to make decisions
concerning those problems will be the same regardless of his receipt of a
targeted letter from an attorney. 8 "The relevant inquiry is not whether
there exists potential clients whose 'condition' makes them susceptible to
undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious
danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility." 2
Here the Court distinguished the difference between direct mailings and
in-person solicitations, which are categorically banned.83 The Court stated
that Shapero's letter lacked "the coercive force of the personal presence
of a trained advocate or the pressure on the potential client for an immediate
yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation. 8 4 The targeted direct-mail
recipient enjoys the ability to disseminate the content of the letter under
73. 108 S. Ct. at 1921.
74. Id.
75. See letter cited supra note 16.
76. Id. at 1922.
77. Id. at 1921.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1921-22.
80. Id. at 1922-23.
81. Id. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
82. 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
83. Id. at 1923.
84. Id. at 1922.
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his own terms and surroundings such that he can "avoid the bombardment
of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." 85
Brennan also conceded that a direct mail letter could be deceptive. He
suggested, however, that rather than a categorical ban, the state would be
better served if a state agency screened the letter/advertisement and thereby
restricted and punished any such abuses.8 6 While Brennan realized that
there are some practical problems of such inspections, and that they will
require additional state or bar resources,8 7 he concluded that these admin-
istrative burdens should not frustrate the protection of accurate and in-
formative commercial speech.88 The majority further reasoned that the
letter's use of underscored, uppercase letters and marketing language89 are
not sufficient reasons for state prohibitions. This conclusion relied upon
the Court's underlying belief that if the contents of the letter are not false
and misleading, then alleged misinformation is not present.9
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, argued that the Court should
"give greater deference to the States' legitimate efforts to regulate advertising
by their attorneys." 91 This legitimate effort is couched in a vital distinction
between professional services and "standardized consumer products. '"9 Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the quality and nature of legal services are
more difficult for the average person to discern, and as a result, potential
mistaken assessments by the consumer have more serious consequences.
"[The practice of offering unsolicited legal advice as a means of enticing
potential clients into a professional relationship is much more likely to be
misleading than ... ordinary consumer goods." 93
The dissent also recognized that unsolicited advice is highly likely to
be colored by the attorneys' economic motives, and these purely capitalistic
motives are "sure to undermine the professional standards that States have
a substantial interest in maintaining. ' 94 Further, the dissent was not con-
vinced that Shapero's letter necessarily falls under commercial speech pro-
tection. It views government intervention as justified when attorney advertising
is either "potentially" or "demonstrably" misleading, or when truthful
advertising "undermines the substantial governmental interest in promoting
the high ethical standards that are necessary in the legal profession." 9
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1923.
87. Id. at 1924.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1924-25.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1925.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Along this line of reasoning, the dissent criticized as inherently mis-
leading the characterization of some legal problems as "routine.''96 Until
all of the facts are disclosed, a legal problem cannot be confidentially
claimed to be "routine." Such a claim in an advertisment undercuts pro-
fessional standards in that it encourages attorneys to accept the economic
risk of binding themselves to a level of fees that could prove inadequate
for the complexity of the work actually involved. 97 In the face of this
problem, the dissent nonetheless conceded that "it may be possible to
devise workable rules that would allow something more than the most
minimal kinds of price advertising by attorneys." 98 It felt, however, that
this is an issue of state concern rather than constitutional adjudication and
concluded that Rule 7.3 "sweeps no more broadly than is necessary to
advance a substantial governmental interest." 99 Accordingly, the dissent
would not deem Kentucky's prohibition of Shapero's letter unconstitutional.
LIFE AFTER SHAPERO
The Shapero decision directly invalidated ABA Model Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 7.3 and will effect at least twenty-four states that adopted
the rule in some form.1'0 The ruling effectively places large scale direct-
mail marketing techniques at the disposal of lawyers. In light of Zauderer,0'
it is not difficult to have foreseen Shapero's result. Zauderer stood for
the proposition that generally distributed, written advertising materials of-
fering non-deceptive legal advice are not coercive or intimidating in nature. 10 2
In Shapero, therefore, the Court reached the logical conclusion that
an advertisement conveying legal advice and suggesting an attorney's services
should not lose its first amendment protection simply because it is mailed
to a particular individual rather than published in a newspaper. As the
Court stated, "the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain
speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally
ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom
it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable." 103 The dissent
conceded that prior caselaw supported the majority's Shapero decision;
unfortunately the ABA lacked this insight and is now forced to rectify
Rule 7.3 in light of the Shapero decision. This forced reformation is the





100. Advertising and Solicitation, LAw. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA),
at 81:2003-06 (Sept. 28, 1988).
101. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
102. Id. at 642.
103. 108 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
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Interestingly, the Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Professional Con-
duct 7.2104 and 7.3105 seem to contain the analysis the Shapero Court was
104. Mo. CT. R. 4(7.2). Rule 7.2 provides in full:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, news-
paper or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television, or through direct
mail advertising distributed generally to persons not known to need legal
services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication
shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record
of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending
the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost
of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and may
pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other
legal service organization.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name
of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
105. Mo. CT. R. 4(7.3). Rule 7.3 states:
(a) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (c), a lawyer may initiate
written communication, not involving personal or telephone contact, with
persons known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer
in a particular matter, for the purpose of obtaining professional employ-
ment.
(b) A lawyer may initiate personal contact including telephone contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional em-
ployment only in the following circumstances and subject to the require-
ments of paragraph (c):
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend, relative or former
client, or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client;
(2) under the auspices of a public or charitable legal services
organization; or
(3) under the auspices of a bona fide political, social, civic,
fraternal employee or trade organization whose purposes include
but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services,
if the legal services are related to the principal purposes of the
organization.
(c) a lawyer shall not initiate a written communication under paragraph
(a) or personal contact, including telephone contact under paragraph (b)
if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical,
emotional or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that
the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a
lawyer;
(2) the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to
receive a communication from the lawyer; or
(3) the communication involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
The Missouri Supreme Court Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 also contains the
following supplemental comment, "This Rule does not permit unrestrained direct
mail solicitation. The restrictions contained in paragraphs (c)(1), (2), and (3) are
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seeking. Missouri Rule 7.3 focuses on the content of the written
communication, as well as any "known or calculated weakness"'' 0 of the
potential client, in its standard for deciding whether to allow or ban written
solicitations.
Rule 7.2 sets out the essential proposition that legal advertising must
provide accurate information. The rule recognizes that although advertising
involves an "active quest" for clients, the public needs information about
legal services. The rule specifically mentions the appropriate mediums,
including direct mail advertisement to those not known to need legal services
of the kind provided by the lawyer.' °7
Rule 7.3 deals specifically with direct contact with prospective clients. 08
This is where the Missouri rule illustrates a prophetical interpretation of
Shapero. The rule recognizes that there is a potential for abuse inherent
in direct soliciting by a lawyer of prospective clients.1 9 In harmony with
Ohralik, the rule prevents personal telephone solicitations by attorneys except
in very limited circumstances. However, it does permit direct mail solici-
tations as long as the attorney does not direct a letter to an individual
having a known or calculated weakness such that the direct mall solicitation
would prove to be unduly coercive in nature.
Here the Missouri Supreme Court Rule reflects the thrust of Shapero:
a potential client known to have a specific problem does not make the
direct mail solicitation unconscionable. Instead, the unconscionability hinges
upon the attorney's knowingly abusing the situation and emotional hand-
icaps of the potential client. The Missouri rule, however, is not without
fault. The "attorney knowledge" standard is difficult to administer. It
requires individual bar associations to inquire extensively into the subjective
intent and reasoning behind the attorney's direct-mall solicitation. 10 Un-
fortunately, the funding realities of some bar associations would not allow
this type of in-depth investigation of all direct-mall requests."'
CONCLUSION
Do Shapero and rules like Missouri's signal a willingness to abandon
professionalism and principles for profit and commercialism? 12 Notice that
106. Id.
107. Mo. CT. R. 4(7.2), supra note 104.
108. Mo. CT. R. 4(7.3), supra note 105.
109. Mo. CT. R. 4(7.3) comment (1988).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally American Bar Association, Commission of Professionalism,
"In The Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) (Report to the ABA Board
of Governors and House of Delegates, New York, N.Y., Aug. 1986). For a critical
commentary, see Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the
Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy.
U. Cm. L.J. 1149 (1987).
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this question presupposes that professionalism can be equated with principle
but not profit, and commercialism with profit but not principle. The
question also implies that a person who conforms to professional principles
is likely to engage in different conduct than a person who does not.
It is not proven that there is any inherent evil between the coexistence
of "professionalism" and "commercialism" in the legal community."' Nor
is it fair to assume that the implementation of commercial advertising
strategies adversely affects attorney's professional ethics.14 But if this is
the case, the concern may better be stated that if attorney ethics are so
easily influenced, is there not something woefully wrong with the criteria
for becoming a member of the "learned profession"?
In addition, society now places an enormous emphasis upon the value
of consumer education. If the legal profession is unwilling to loosen its
grip upon the antiquated concepts of advertising, it must be prepared to
provide the necessary information that the public not only seeks, but has
a right to know about legal services. In other words, if consumer education
cannot take place in advertising, the legal profession must provide forums,
such as seminars and lectures, for the general public. Unfortunately, the
various bar associations have proven to be extremely ineffective and un-
willing to provide these settings for consumer inquiry into the various
aspects of legal services and fees.
In many respects lawyers are different from individuals engaged in
other occupations. These differences are found in many attributes, including
education, standards of admission, average income, type of work, and so
on. However, attaching the "profession" label to legal work, or separating
lawyers from other segments by labelling the latter "business," does not
help in defining an attorney's duty to clients and members of the public.
Instead, it may be more accurate to read the term "profession" as a
type of occupation engaged in the application of "theoretical and complex
knowledge to the practical solution of human and social problems;""' 5 and
the term "business" as an enterprise conducted for profit. Thus, a law
firm can be regarded as a business that engages in the profession of
practicing law. It is along these lines that Shapero seems to state that an
attorney's commercialism is not the demise of his professionalism.
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